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Abstract 
We propose that a coherent and thoroughgoing version of realism, known as situational 
realism, offers a unifying programme for psychology. This realism emerges from the 
conditions of being that enable knowledge and discourse. Because this research 
originated largely in a century’s work by Australian psychologists and philosophers, we 
will introduce and explain research and vocabulary that might be unfamiliar to some 
readers. The approach is characterised by seven themes: ontological egalitarianism; 
situational complexity and process orientation; a network or field view of causality; a 
realist logic; a view of relations as nonconstitutive; an externalist relational approach to 
mind; and acceptance of critical inquiry as the core scientific method. The combination of 
these features offers psychology the following: a metatheoretical framework that resolves 
current tensions; expansion into the field of meanings and reintegration with 
hermeneutics and semiotics; clarification and redirection of mainstream cognitive 
neuroscience and information processing; an integrative approach to personality; 
expansion, redirection and unification of psychological research methods; and revision 
and expansion in psychological practice and teaching. 
Keywords:  realism, situational realism, unifying psychology, metatheory, integration 
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Unifying Psychology Through Situational Realism 
 Most mainstream psychologists would consider themselves realists: There is an 
objective world that includes human minds and behaviour, and these can be investigated 
scientifically. They would also be aware of opposition to this realist stance, mainly from 
those outside the mainstream favouring qualitative methods and relativist or 
constructionist philosophical approaches. However, there are many varieties of realism 
(cf. Archer et al., 1998; Harré, 1986; Hartwig, 2007; Varela & Harré, 2007), and some 
have greater potential than others for bridging divides within the wider field of 
psychology. We argue that a coherent and thoroughgoing approach is achieved in 
situational realism (Mackay and Petocz, 2011a); its themes fit together without 
contradiction and apply without compromise. The failure to systematically adopt such a 
realism explains many of psychology’s difficulties, and helps explain the expanding 
ranks of dissatisfied and disaffected psychologists (cf. Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). It is 
unfortunate, therefore, that this realism is “probably the least known” of realisms 
(Greenwood, 2007, p. 605); it is confused with the other types of realism and is 
sometimes confused with generic positivism (cf. Hibberd, 2007, 2010). Situational 
realism defines psychology as the study of those organism-environment relations and 
interactions (dynamical systems) that involve the psychological categories cognition, 
motivation and emotion. This realism deserves to be better known, not least for its ability 
to resolve age-old tensions and unify psychology. 
 We will discuss briefly the historical origins of this approach, and identify and explain 
its seven key interrelated features or principles. We will then lay out the unifying 
programme for psychology offered by this realism, ranging across theory, research and 
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teaching. Finally, we will address briefly the question how this approach relates to other 
unifying approaches.   
Background, Major Themes and Extension to Psychology 
 Situational realism is not the work of a single individual, but its core is in the system 
developed by the Scottish-Australian philosopher John Anderson (1893-1962), Challis 
Professor of Philosophy (initially including psychology) at Sydney University from 1927 
to 1958: hence Andersonian, Sydney or Australian realism (for a reader-friendly account 
see Baker, 1986
1
). More recently, the term situational realism has been adopted 
(Hibberd, 2007, 2009; Mackay & Petocz, 2011a
2
) as better reflecting realism’s central 
theme (see later) and its wider historical roots in the ancient Greek, British (particularly 
Scottish) and American realist traditions. Situational realism combines strands of 
thinking from pre-Socratic (especially Heraclitean) and Aristotelian philosophy, from 
Thomas Reid and the Australian-English philosopher Samuel Alexander, from William 
James and the American New Realists, E. B. Holt, R. B. Perry, and others (e.g., Holt et 
al., 1912). It has similarities to the (independently developed) direct realist ecological 
approach of the perceptual psychologist J. J. Gibson (Gibson, 1966, 1979), and it fits with 
more recent radical (i.e., direct realist) embodied cognitive science (Chemero, 2009) and 
the revival of neorealism (Tonneau, 2004). 
 Realism is a kind of “first principles” approach whose themes emerge from what 
Anderson called the “conditions of discourse” (1927a/1962, p. 11), which are revealed to 
be also the conditions of existence, of facts. Hence realism is not so much a “theory” or a 
                                                 
1
 Also Grave, 1984; Mackie, 1962; Passmore, 1962, 1977; Anderson’s essays in Anderson (1962), and his 
lecture notes and other material at the University of Sydney’s “John Anderson Archive” at 
http://adc.library.usyd.edu.au/index.jsp?database=anderson&collection=anderson&page=home 
2
 Although we there followed the tradition of favouring the unqualified term “realism”, the existence of 
alternative versions of realism prompts us, for clarity’s sake, to follow recent convention.  
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“new paradigm” as the very precondition of discourse and understanding (Stove, 1991). 
For realism, “metaphysics” is not a dirty word, because it is not about an unknowable 
reality behind experience; it is about the reality that is already in and required by 
experience (cf. Baker, 1986, pp. 95ff; Groarke, 2009). 
 Situational realism is characterised by a set of interconnected features or principles, as 
summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Seven Features/Principles of Situational Realism 
 
Feature/principle 
 
Description 
 
 
1. Ontological egalitarianism 
 
There are no philosophically privileged elements of “being” that are 
more real than others. There are only complex spatio-temporal 
situations. There are no “levels” of reality and traditional dualisms 
are invalid (e.g., matter/spirit, free/determined, universal/particular).  
 
2. Situational complexity and 
process orientation 
 
Reality is a collection of infinitely complex situations. Situations are 
complex spatio-temporal occurrences that are always in process, 
always historically and contextually embedded. 
 
3. Network or field view of 
causality 
 
Situations arise from antecedent conditions, but causality is not a 
simple two-term linear (cause-effect) sequence. Causality is a 
complex three-term relation (cause, causal field or conditions, 
effect). Within the causal field things have their characteristic ways 
of working, by which they are constrained and, in turn, constrain 
other things. 
 
4. Realist logic  
 
Logic is not an abstract language or calculus or laws of thought. It 
deals with the laws of things, with the general forms of situations 
and with relations of implication between situations.  
 
5. Relations as non-
constitutive 
 
Everything is related (spatially, temporally, causally, etc.) to other 
things. Those relations are always external to the things related and 
cannot be found in them. Nothing is (partially or wholly) constituted 
by its relations with other things.  
 
6. Externalist relational view 
of mind/mentality 
 
There is no such thing as mind; mind/mentality is a particular kind of 
relation between a subject (organism/person/knower) and the object 
(situation that is known). Thus, mind is not internal to brain, and the 
objects of mental relations (whether veridical or nonveridical) are 
external to the subject.  
 
7. Science as critical inquiry 
 
Science investigates natural (including human) systems. It is 
premised on recognition of cognitive fallibility. Its core feature is not 
experimentation or mathematisation or measurement, but critical 
inquiry—careful, systematic investigation, employing best available 
error-detection mechanisms, testing hypotheses via both logical and 
observational tests. 
  
Note. Although some of these features occur in other (realist and nonrealist) approaches, we take the 
combination and systematic interlinking of all seven to be distinctive of situational realism. 
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 Situational realism first influenced philosophy (e.g., Armstrong, 1968, 1997, 2010; 
Mackie, 1974; Passmore, 1970; Place, 1956; Smart, 1959; Stove, 1981, 1991), then 
extended to psychology, developing into a strong tradition, mainly at the University of 
Sydney  (e.g., Henry, 2009; Hibberd, 2005; Maze, 1983a; McMullen, 1996, 2001; 
Michell, 1988; O’Neil, 1957, 1968, 1987; Sutcliffe, 1993). Realist work in psychology 
was vigorously pursued, but its publication was scattered and piecemeal over several 
decades. 
 Recently, we systematically collated its themes into a 900-page collection of 23 essays 
old and new, and presented them as a clear and recognisable position in psychology 
(Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). This collection contains discussion of many 
topics, including the themes listed in Table 1: historical development and contemporary 
relevance (Hibberd, 2009); the state of theory in psychology (Mackay & Petocz, 2011b); 
direct realism and cognition as a relation between knower and known (Anderson, 
1927b/1962; Michell, 1988); attitudes and moral beliefs (Maze, 1973); mental causation 
(Medlow, 2011); a motivational theory of drives and consummatory actions (Maze, 
1983b; Newbery, 2011);  drives and affects in personality theory (McIlwain, 2007); 
mental plurality (Boag, 2005); how and why concepts are “out there” and not “in here” 
(McMullen, 2011); category, concept and class (Sutcliffe, 1993); representationism 
versus realism (Maze, 1991); the problem of false beliefs, hallucinations and other forms 
of error (Rantzen, 1993); social constructionism and deconstructionism (Maze, 2001); a 
realist reply to Gergen’s social constructionism (Hibberd, 2002); psychotherapy and 
accounts of meaning (Mackay, 2003a, 2003b); symbolism (Petocz, 2011a); realism and 
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cultural studies (Bell, 2003); measurement in psychology (Michell, 2000); qualitative 
research in psychology (Michell, 2004); and science and meaning in the scientist-
practitioner model of treatment (Petocz, 2004).     
 When these discussions become too philosophical, the practising experimentalist often 
wonders what this all has to do with them, or, if they are thinking more pragmatically, 
what do we think they should be doing instead. To this, we have answered: “it really does 
all depend” (Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, p. 879, emphasis in original). One reviewer of the 
book (Swami, 2012) asks for  “a more thoroughgoing reply” that provides an “explicit 
transitional programme” (pp. 264-5). In the rest of this paper, we shall focus on realism’s 
unifying promise and programme for psychology.  
Situational Realism’s Unifying Programme for Psychology 
 The programme consists of: a metatheoretical framework that resolves current 
tensions; expansion into the field of meanings by reintegration with the traditional 
methods of studying meaning, hermeneutics and semiotics; clarification and redirection 
of mainstream cognitive neuroscience and information processing; an integrative 
approach to personality; expansion, redirection and unification of psychological research 
methods; and revision and expansion in psychological practice and teaching.  
A Metatheoretical Framework that Resolves Current Tensions 
 Ostensibly psychology is non-Cartesian, having replaced Cartesian matter/spirit 
dualism with a realist materialism. Yet it remains trapped in a subtle and persistent 
Cartesianism (Bennett & Hacker, 2003, p. 111; Leahey, 2004, p. 141).  
 A number of new movements of expansion and integration present their proposals as 
part of “an anti-Cartesian turn” (Wheeler, 2005, p. 16). These include second generation 
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cognitive science (Kövecses, 2005), embodied-embedded cognitive science (Gallagher, 
2005; Wheeler, 2005), evolutionary psychology (Buss, 2005), evolutionary social 
psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 2005), affective neuroscience (Panksepp, 1998), 
developmental neuro-psychoanalysis (Schore, 2003a, 2003b), and cognitive semiotics 
(Andreassan, Brandt & Vang, 2007; Donald & Andreassan, 2007; Jorna & van Heusden, 
1998). Proponents searching for a “new theoretical framework” insist that it will not be 
Cartesian, but some are explicitly unsure what this alternative framework could be. The 
Cartesian legacy remains, hampering the kind of integration that is justifiably sought (see 
Petocz, 2011a, pp. 609-612; 2011b, pp. 107-111). 
 Situational realism resolves this by “going right back beyond the Cartesian starting 
points, of dualism in metaphysics, and representationism in epistemology” (Stove, 1991, 
p. 102). From the principles listed in Table 1, realism involves redefinitions of 
psychology’s key terms and subject matter. Instead of the current textbook definition of 
psychology as the study of mind and behaviour, realism defines psychology as the study 
of those organism-environment relations and interactions (dynamical systems) that 
involve the psychological categories cognition, motivation and emotion. Instead of 
cognition as the internal processing of information, realism defines cognition (in all 
modalities, and whether conscious or unconscious) as a particular kind of relation 
between organism and its environment (cf. Michell, 2011). The subject term of this 
relation is a brain connected to its sensory apparatus – hence, an embodied brain.
3
 Instead 
of defining motivation teleogically, realism defines motivation as the energising and 
directing “biological engines” of the organism, connected to attachment systems and to 
                                                 
3 This excludes computers as currently conceived, although in principle there is no reason why a non-
organic system could not be a cogniser; the critical issue is whether a system is in fact sensitive to the full 
structure of environmental situations (see below and Michell, 2011). 
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the organism’s cognitive apparatus (e.g., the Darwinian-derived Freudian instinctual 
drives) (cf. Maze, 1983a; Newbery, 2011). Instead of emotion/affect as the internal 
registration of the state of the body, realism defines emotion/affect either as a complex 
combination of cognition and motivation rooted in drive-ancillary structures, or as drive-
equivalent motivational structures (McIlwain, 2007).
4
 Cognition (in all of its modes) is 
never disinterested, because embedded in the cognitive situation is the motivated subject-
term of the cognitive relation. Being an external relation, cognition is observable in the 
guiding of the organism’s movements during its behavioural actions (Michell, 2011). 
Thus behaviour is not mere mindless movement, it is inextricably cognitive (Maze, 
1983a). Furthermore, the cognitive situation is embedded in its social and historical 
context; “Individual psychology”, as Freud put it, “is at the same time social psychology 
as well” (1921/1955, p. 69). Thus, to study cognition, motivation and emotion, the 
researcher must not only include both terms (i.e., subject and object) of the relevant 
relations, but also examine the interactions between those relations and others, including 
the causal and contextual conditions under which the relations and their interactions take 
place (we expand on this general theme below).  
 These realist revisions of psychology’s key terms are combined with challenging the 
long-held gulf between “science” and “meaning” in psychology, a legacy of the 
presumed gap between Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften. Phenomena in 
both groups are part of the same reality, and enjoy the same ontological status--that of 
complex situations occurring in space and time--and are equally open to the core 
scientific method of critical inquiry that encompasses both hermeneutic and causal 
                                                 
4
 As we note (Mackay & Petocz, 2011a, p. 877), the nature and role of emotion/affect is debated amongst 
realist thinkers (cf. Anderson, 1934/1962; Boag, 2008; McMullen, 1996). 
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questions. Realism charts a course for psychology between mainstream scientism and 
postmodernist antiscience (cf. Haack, 2003; Petocz, 2001, 2004). 
Research in the Field of Meanings and Reintegration with Hermeneutics and 
Semiotics  
 If meanings (in their different manifestations) are real relational situations involving 
humans and other cognising organisms (e.g., X means Y to person P), and are equally 
part of the causal structure of the world, then they comprise an essential part of the 
subject matter of psychology. Realism thus embraces the study of meanings and prompts 
re-thinking the place of hermeneutics and semiotics, the traditional disciplines studying 
meaning, in psychology. Regarding hermeneutics, realism rehabilitates questions of 
meaning and qualitative methods of hermeneutic inquiry within its broader conception of 
scientific method (Mackay, 2003a, 2003b). Regarding semiotics, realism assists recent 
attempts to integrate semiotics and psychology by first clarifying the irreducible tripartite 
relational nature of meaning. This distinguishes the legitimate concerns of representation 
in the information sciences (e.g., what are the most efficient ways to design auditory 
warnings for artificial environments – see Petocz, Keller & Stevens, 2008) from 
incoherent epistemological representationism (representations in the brain cannot be 
genuine symbols - see below; also Michell, 1988; Petocz, 2011b, pp. 119-121). 
Psychological research can then proceed into investigating how different types of sign 
(icons or pictures, indicators, symbolic substitutes, etc.) can solve problems in 
information representation research. For example, in the field of auditory warnings, some 
types of sound-event mappings are readily learned, whereas others that are expected to be 
easily learned are not (see Petocz et al., 2008). The research door is also opened onto the 
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field of conceptual metaphor (e.g., Gibbs, 2011; Kövecses, 2010; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999), which stands on the frontier of embodiment approaches (e.g., Clark, 1997; 
Gallagher, 2005) and “second generation cognitive science” (e.g., Kövecses, 2005). In 
conceptual metaphor, we think of abstract concepts (e.g., mind, love, time) in terms of 
more concrete or bodily experience (mind is a container, love is a journey, time is a 
moving object). Thus, the whole field of signs, symbols, metaphors and meanings is 
brought into the domain of primary bodily and motivational experiences  (see Petocz, 
1999, 2011a, 2011b). 
Clarification and Redirection of Mainstream Cognitive Neuroscience and 
Information Processing 
 Situational realism is antireductionist (Table 1: 1, 2, 5, 6). The brain is only one part of 
the mental relation, and so is necessary, but not by itself sufficient for psychology. 
Neither the mental relation, nor, a fortiori, mental “processes” and “structures” can be 
found in the brain; experiences do not happen in brains, and concepts are to be found “out 
there” not “in here” (McMullen, 2011). This has implications for the dominant 
computational information-processing model and the interpretation of neurophysiological 
data in psychology’s experimental heartland. Rather than the mind being the brain’s 
software, with mind and brain being different “levels” of a spatially coextensive unit, 
mind extends into the brain’s environment: “no theory of the brain alone will be 
applicable to the combined brain-body-environment system (Chemero, 2009, pp. 178). 
Psychology is reducible to neuroscience only if the psychological is confined to the head 
and the environment is mentally represented. But the computer model of the brain/mind 
is misguided (Michell, 1988) and the representationism supposedly derived from it is 
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logically incoherent (Bickhard, 1996; Heil, 1981; McMullen, 2012). Neurophysiological 
data give us only correlative information about the state of the subject when it stands in 
particular psychological relations, not a picture of the physical instantiation of 
consciousness, which extends across the whole organism-environment system.  
 Realism thus “cashes out” the metaphors of information processing, as being 
statements about what in the environment is perceived, responded to, remembered, etc. 
(cf. Tonneau, 2004). For example, memory is neither an internal mechanism or store, nor 
the direct accessing of an internal token of a past event (cf. McMullen, 2012); the 
difference between the “stores” of  “short-term” versus “long-term” is a difference 
between what is remembered – recent versus more distant events. There is no “problem” 
of knowledge or consciousness, no “binding problem”, no “problem of mental 
causation”, nor is psychology threatened by imminent “tectonic collision with 
neuroscience” (Lloyd, 2010, p. 1). Instead, experimental cognitive and perceptual 
psychologists can join those who are already investigating empirical questions within a 
coherent realist framework (e.g., Best, 1995; Best & Tyler, 2007; see also Chemero, 
2009, pp. 195-7).  
An Integrative Approach to Personality  
 Personality (despite efforts to restrict it to “individual differences”) is that specific 
area that incorporates and attempts to connect all other areas in psychology. Thus Hall 
and Lindzey (1970) maintain, “we are willing to accept any general theory of human 
behaviour as a theory of personality” (p. ix). Recently there have been complaints that 
“personality psychology … continues to retreat from its unique historical mission … to 
provide an integrative framework for understanding the whole person.” (McAdams & 
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Pals, 2006, p. 204, emphasis in original). Instead, textbooks present “a parade of 
alternative grand theories” founded upon incompatible “first principles” (i.e., 
assumptions about human nature), with no attempt at overall integration. Worse, “the 
grand theories are faith-based systems whose first principles are untested and untestable”, 
so that “choosing a grand theory to believe in may boil down to deciding which first 
principle simply ‘feels right’ ” (p. 205). Mayer (1998, 2001) agrees that the grand 
theories are speculative and lack research, but adds that the narrower empirical research 
approaches (e.g., the trait approach) are directionless and lack theoretical grounding.  
 Situational realism questions the notion that the major theories’ incompatible 
assumptions are “untestable”. Realism’s broader view of science recognises the 
legitimacy and primacy of logical testing (cf. Petocz & Newbery, 2010). Thus, the 
assumptions of different personality theories can be critically examined to establish a 
coherent theoretical foundation for a comprehensive, integrated theory incorporating the 
compatible strengths of the various theories. Such an integrated theory, resting on the 
realist revisions of key psychological terms and the realist combination of hermeneutic 
and causal inquiry, overlaps with Freudian psychoanalytic theory and coherently grounds 
empirical research (cf. Boag, 2012; Maze,1983a; McIlwain, 2007, 2009; Newbery, 
2012a; Petocz, 1999; Westen, 1998). 
Expansion, Redirection and Unification of Psychological Research Methods  
 Realism’s broader view of science as critical inquiry and its equal acceptance of 
relational, qualitative and quantitative structures brings unification to psychological 
research methods. This potential can be realized via a sequence of methodological 
expansion, redirection and further expansion.  
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 First, the notion of scientific method is expanded to include conceptual analysis 
(Machado & Silva, 2007) and theoretical research, both as primary in the testing 
process; that is, we must recognize as a methodological first-principle that an incoherent 
or conceptually flawed theory cannot be empirically tested (Petocz & Newbery, 2010). 
Once they are accepted as a crucial part of the scientific process, conceptual analysis 
leads to further expanding psychology’s conception of scientific method by revealing that 
qualitative approaches are both legitimate and warranted (Bryman, 1988; Michell, 2004). 
Specific methods must be determined by, and appropriately attuned to, the nature of the 
subject matter under investigation – based on empirical examination of successes and 
failures. A new attention to conceptual analysis also redirects psychology’s research 
attention onto the various confused assumptions about probability, evidence, induction, 
generalisation, validity, etc. that underlie psychology’s quantitative and statistical data-
analytic practices (Groarke, 2009; Michell, 1990, 1997, 2009a, 2009b; Petocz & 
Newbery, 2010). There is compelling evidence that psychology must reconsider its 
special-purpose approach to measurement; the psychological variables that are 
“measured” via rating scales rarely appear to meet the mathematical criterion for being 
“quantitative”, and are not measureable in a proper scientific sense (see Michell, 2010). 
While such observations are usually seen as nihilistic attempts to end psychological 
research, nothing could be further from the truth here. Acceptance of the non-quantitative 
character of many phenomena of interest to psychologists will further redirect research 
efforts by pointing out the work to be done in following two important research paths: 
testing hypotheses regarding quantitativity (and hence measurability) of psychological 
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variables (Michell, 2000); and exploring the relatively untapped field of nonquantitative 
structures (causal, logical, semantic, algebraic, categorical, etc.) (Michell, 2001).  
 Finally, realism unifies psychology’s research methods in three important ways. First, 
all methods are united under the umbrella notion of science as critical inquiry; theoretical 
research and conceptual analysis apply across the board and throughout the research 
process (Cohen & Nagel, 1934; Petocz & Newbery, 2010). Second, realism resolves 
current debates regarding how best to enrich psychology’s narrow conception of 
scientific method. For example, Machado and Silva (2007) propose to reintroduce 
conceptual analysis, whereas Haig (2008) replies that we should instead be focusing on 
developing new theories of scientific method, such as extending induction to abduction 
and incorporating Bayesian analysis into the hypothetico-deductive method (Haig, 2005). 
But conceptual analysis is not merely a linguistic or grammatical enterprise; it deals with 
the logical structures of real situations, so is already central to scientific method, and 
already includes what Haig deems to be an alternative. Third, realism resolves the 
quantitative/qualitative debate by exposing underlying confusions. It has been shown 
repeatedly that, though the mainstream of the field claims to be realist and quantitative, 
they implicitly pursue antirealist, positivist, practices that are at odds with the realism of 
the physical sciences that they wish to emulate (Gigerenzer, 1987; Grayson, 1988, 1998; 
Michell, 2000, 2001, 2009b; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Rozeboom, 1960). The 
qualitative nonmainstream’s commitment to antirealist relativism and constructionism is 
undermined by the fact that they accept and use qualitative methods that rest on realist 
assumptions (cf. Bell, 2010; Hibberd, 2001, 2002; Michell, 2003; Petocz & Newbery, 
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2010). Situational realism thus rehabilitates qualitative research methods into scientific 
psychology without the tension created in most current attempts at integration.  
Revision and Expansion in Psychological Practice and Teaching 
 Psychological practice is based on the North American scientist-practitioner model 
(cf. Belar & Perry, 1991). Psychologists are taught to be scientists first, then 
practitioners; practice must be scientifically based, implementing only those interventions 
that are evidence-based and derived from sound theory and rigorous empirical research. 
But this model is only as good as its underlying conception of science. Situational 
realism’s broader approach to science as critical inquiry incorporates theoretical research, 
conceptual analysis, re-examination of measurement and expansion into qualitative 
methods. Its focus on situational complexity and process orientation promotes 
contextualism and attunement to individual differences, suggesting greater flexibility in 
psychological treatment approaches. For example, it entails the validity of hermeneutic 
inquiry and thus fosters a scientific version of psychodynamic theory and therapy 
(Shedler, 2010). Realism’s network or field approach to causality fits with the evidence 
suggesting that the “active ingredients” in psychotherapeutic intervention may not be 
those typically nominated by proponents of specific theories. For example, as King et al. 
(2010) urge, “it is time for those universities that have not already done so to move 
beyond the convenient but intellectually dishonest position that CBT is the only 
evidence-based psychotherapy” (p. 4). All this points to reinterpretation and expansion of 
the science basis of the scientist-practitioner model of training, and expansion of what are 
accepted as evidence-based interventions (Mace, Moorey & Roberts, 2001; Petocz, 
2004).   
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 Regarding the teaching of psychology, situational realism’s major implication is the 
adoption of a nondogmatic approach, reflecting the controversies and uncertainties in the 
field, and encouraging critical inquiry, examination of assumptions and creativity in the 
development of new methods (Newbery, 2012b). Consistent with realism’s contextualism 
and process orientation, a developmental approach would be taken in all areas of 
psychology. Hence, the teaching curriculum would expand to include the history and 
philosophy not just of psychology, but also of science. Then the curriculum would focus 
on theory and meta-theory, conceptual analysis, and critical thinking. In particular, the 
teaching of research methods would be expanded to reflect realism’s impact: students 
would learn that “research” includes theoretical research, and that testing theories or 
hypotheses requires logical tests to be passed before empirical tests are warranted; 
qualitative and quantitative methods would be taught under the single umbrella of science 
as critical inquiry (cf. Bryman, 1988), and not separately by different teachers positioned 
on either side of an ideological divide; students would learn about the various 
assumptions underlying statistical methods of analysis, probability, evidence and their 
interrelationships, including the socio-historical, political and ideological factors behind 
psychology’s adoption of various methods; they would learn how to test hypotheses 
concerning quantitativity; they would learn existing qualitative methods and be 
encouraged to explore novel approaches to nonquantitative structures. Moreover, the 
teaching of psychology would include psychology’s interdisciplinary context, with 
appropriate acknowledgment of cross-disciplinary themes and interdisciplinary 
connections. Students would recognise psychology as the “self-reflexive discipline” par 
excellence. By becoming aware of the “powerful impact of disciplinary socialization 
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practices” in psychology (Good, 2007, p. 286), such as those that currently exclude 
theoretical research from funding, students would be better prepared to take the discipline 
forward.  
Why Situational Realism? 
 With unification now on the agenda for psychology (cf. Cleeremans, 2012; Lloyd, 
2010), there is a smorgasbord of offerings for psychologists. Why, then, should 
psychologists adopt situational realism? What makes it, in our opinion, the healthiest 
option, despite its initially unpalatable aspects, such as deflationist revisions of claims in 
neuropsychology, or the limitation of quantitative methods and statistics to their 
realistically determined domains of application? The simple answer is that to pursue 
psychology scientifically one must adopt this realism or fall ultimately into contradiction 
(Mackay & Petocz, 2011a). But coherence isn’t enough, so it is important to note that 
realism also has enough scope and depth to form a basis for the field. As such, it 
integrates the traditional areas of psychology (cognition, learning, personality, 
motivation, social, abnormal, etc.) while also sustaining a number of other unifying 
approaches (albeit some suitably modified): behavioural and perceptual approaches; 
evolutionary, developmental, contextualist, historical and dynamical systems approaches; 
embodiment, process-oriented, ecological and enactivist approaches; and semiotic, 
hermeneutic, phenomenological and cultural approaches. 
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